Ecuador’s security crisis is reshaping how the government sees domestic issues and how it engages with the world. The new diplomatic playbook the government is utilizing, marked by military deals, foreign troops and the rhetoric of war, makes the shift in Ecuador plain. Within the approach to the security crisis lies the government’s intent to turn its foreign policy into an extension of its mano dura agenda: an iron-fist response to the spiraling violence at home. However, this laser-like focus can lead the government to misread the crisis and, in doing so, weaken the partnerships Ecuador needs to confront it.
Conflict at home
To understand the government’s approach, the domestic context matters. Ecuador’s current government has framed the security crisis as an “internal armed conflict” and decided to advance further domestic militarization. The country’s deep security crisis, which currently claims 30 lives a day, has ushered in a political reset in the government’s actions.
As a consequence of the consistent violence, this crisis has secured President Daniel Noboa a second term backed by a legislative majority and broad electoral support for his tough-on-crime style. The strategy Noboa is deploying borrows from Latin American models built for different threats. Declaring an “internal conflict” mirrors Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s war-like approach in the country’s security crisis. Furthermore, the labeling of local gangs as terrorists echoes how Colombia has historically treated guerrilla groups. However, Ecuador is not fighting the same kind of conflict as Colombia and El Salvador.
Ecuador’s criminal landscape is shaped by fragmented gangs tied to international organized crime. Most Ecuadorian gangs merely operate as logistical partners, moving cocaine to Europe and running illegal mines tied to foreign networks. Framing these gangs as terrorists in a domestic war ignores the larger source of conflict in Ecuador’s security crisis. Thus, the Ecuadorian government doubles down on a flawed reading of the conflicts. Further, Noboa’s adoption of mano dura has not stopped at Ecuador’s borders; it now defines the country’s foreign policy.
A shift in foreign policy
The shift is already playing out in ways that leave Ecuador’s traditional foreign policy instincts behind. Once sovereignty-first, Ecuador’s diplomacy now functions as a platform to enlist foreign powers in its war on crime, including moving tooverturn a long-standing ban on foreign military bases. With Ecuador planning to host US naval forces in Manta and having reached out to Erik Prince’s Blackwater paramilitary to support Ecuadorian training, the government has paved the way for foreign military presence. Simply put, the government now sees foreign policy as an extension of its domestic mano dura.
Global relations and the source of the problem
While Ecuador is receiving international aid, the misreading of Ecuador’s situation by its government has important implications for foreign policy and resolving the conflict. By defining a transnational crisis as a domestic war, Ecuador isolates the problem to its borders and forces itself to bear the blame and burden of a crisis it did not create alone. Rather than shaping a narrative of global responsibility, Ecuador’s government is turning inward and viewing the crisis as a domestic issue. With this perspective, Ecuador is relying on militarized partnerships to control and resolve a conflict within its borders.
The diplomatic cost of how Ecuador’s government presents its situation is not minor. By narrowing the crisis to Ecuador’s borders, the government sidelines the potential cooperative partnerships it needs to lead an internationally coordinated response.
Among the most critical and most overlooked partnerships are with cocaine-consuming countries like those in Europe and the Americas. Though absent from Noboa’s rhetoric on where the crisis is located, these regions are central to the violence Ecuador faces. The demand in these areas sustains the trade and, by extension, the violence.
Ecuador’s global relationships and next steps
Ecuador has shown no clear interest in building coalitions with consumer countries, specifically holding them accountable for the current security crisis. Since taking office, Noboa has made several trips to Europe and the US, focusing on security cooperation, technology transfer and intelligence sharing, rather than raising the shared responsibility these countries have as consumers.
In early 2024, the government hosted the mayors of Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg (Europe’s key cocaine ports) in Quito, Ecuador. However, the gesture lacked meaningful follow-up from either side as a strategy to build long-lasting coalitions with consumer nations, and next steps were not finalized. Thus, Ecuador’s actions, along with these meetings, will not be able to move beyond symbolism. To fix the transnational issue, consumer countries must be treated not only as enforcement partners but as direct actors in a market that is driving Ecuador’s collapse.
Mano dura has equally undermined Ecuador’s regional coalition-building. In a region where organized crime is deeply intertwined with neighboring countries, coordinated Latin American action is essential to confront the cross-border networks that sustain it. Ecuador’s recent actions have done the opposite to support Latin partnerships.
In late 2024, Ecuador hosted the Ibero-American Summit in Cuenca, a biennial meeting where Latin American and Iberian heads of state gather to discuss regional cooperation. This time, none of the Latin American presidents attended. Their absence followed Ecuador’s controversial raid on Mexico’s embassy, which violated international law and drew widespread condemnation.
While the Latin American boycott from the conference was not officially declared, the message was clear: the Ecuadorian government’s actions eroded regional trust. What could have been a platform for building a shared security strategy became a symbol of diplomatic isolation and a missed opportunity, shaped in part by the same mano dura logic the government applies at home.
What is at stake for Ecuador’s future is the chance to build bridges and strategically position itself on the global stage. Ecuador has an opportunity to lead on a crisis with global roots. But by framing the security crisis as an internal issue and doubling down on militarized partnerships, the government has narrowed down its options to resolve the matter. The current trajectory may deliver a short-term impact, but the government risks long-term stagnation. Furthermore, the Ecuadorian government may miss the chance to reshape policies around the world when countries are willing to support Ecuador.
[Georgianne Martinez Cushmore edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
The post All Muscle, Little Friends: Ecuador’s Foreign Policy Problem appeared first on Fair Observer.
from Fair Observer https://ift.tt/TfBbYiS
0 Comments