China has long aimed to be the top dog in Asia. Historically, the Chinese have called their state Zhōngguó, which literally means the Middle Kingdom. For centuries, China was the dominant global economy and the most powerful empire in the world. Beijing sees itself as reclaiming its rightful position in the world after the century of humiliation that began with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and ended with the defeat of Japan in World War II (1945).
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission tells us that China’s strategy in South Asia is to check the rise of India. To do so, Beijing is exploiting the India-Pakistan rivalry. It is also cultivating influence among other South Asian countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
The China-Pakistan relationship is well known. Not so well-known is the fact that China has deepened its relationship with Bangladesh. Beijing has entwined itself deeply into Bangladesh’s economy, infrastructure, digital systems and security matrix.
The courting of Dhaka: How the Dragon slipped in
Bangladesh was born in 1971 thanks to India’s going to war against Pakistan. Thanks to its role in liberating Bangladesh, India earned much goodwill in the young nation on the Bay of Bengal. Relations between the two countries remained close for decades.
Warning signs for the India-Bangladesh relationship appeared as early as 2004. That year, China replaced India as Bangladesh’s “top source of imports.” One of these was cotton, a key ingredient for Bangladesh’s booming textile industry that churns out jeans, t-shirts, shirts, etc, for Western retailers like Costco, Walmart and Amazon.
Bangladesh has given China special economic zones, such as one in the strategic port city of Chittagong and the other in the national capital of Dhaka. China has also invested and continues to invest in roads, bridges, power plants and ports. Bangladesh became the first country in South Asia to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In 2016, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Dhaka and the two countries, upgrading the China-Bangladesh relationship to “a strategic cooperative partnership.” Since 2016, Chinese investment has flowed into Bangladesh. As in many other parts of the world, China is involved in huge infrastructure projects. Importantly, China has a near-monopoly in high-tech construction and a key presence in key transportation corridors.
Early this year, Bangladesh made a major foreign policy shift. Under Sheikh Hasina, the previous leader who was ousted by street protests in July-August 2024, Bangladesh walked the diplomatic tightrope, balancing India and China. Wahiduzzaman Noor and Samantha Wong of the Atlantic Council point out that China became Bangladesh’s top trading partner during the last ten years of Hasina’s rule. Worryingly for India, China also became Bangladesh’s top supplier of military hardware. Yet Hasina was able to keep India onside. It helped that her party had historic links with India. Her father was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh, who began the Awami League, and Hasina inherited his legacy.
Since Hasina was ousted, relations between Bangladesh and India have steadily and dramatically deteriorated. Historically, every new Bangladeshi leader has made India the first foreign destination after taking power. Muhammad Yunus, chief adviser of the Bangladeshi interim government, broke with tradition and made his first state visit to Beijing, not Delhi. Bangladesh has now very publicly made a “pivot toward China.”
Closer Bangladesh-China relations threaten India
The March 2025 Yunus Beijing visit has led to increased Chinese investments in Bangladesh. Yunus secured $2.1 billion in investments, loans and grants. Notably, the Chinese will invest $400 million to modernize Mongla Port. This is Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport, and just before Hasina was defenestrated, India had secured operating rights to a terminal at Mongla. Last year, India scored “a strategic win” in the port wars of the two Asian giants. In March, China came out tops.
Chinese investment in Mongla raises Indian concerns because it is part of Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy. China is building the ports of Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in the Maldives, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, Lamu in Kenya and Bagamoyo in Tanzania. Beijing claims that these facilities are for commercial use, but in the future, the Chinese navy could use these ports as naval bases or logistical hubs. This geopolitical string of pearls contains India and ties up China’s populous southern neighbor in its own backyard.
China will also help Bangladesh in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. This alarms India. Originating in the Indian state of Sikkim, the Teesta flows into Bangladesh, and its water secures the lives and livelihoods of millions of Bangladeshis. India has built the Teesta Barrage to generate electricity and supply water to farmers in the state of West Bengal (note that West Bengal and Bangladesh were both part of the state of Bengal in British India till independence in 1947). Both India and Bangladesh want more of Teesta’s water. A population explosion since independence means that northern West Bengal and northern Bangladesh have a greater demand for water. The Teesta Water Dispute is one of the rising number of geopolitical tensions over water.
There is another matter of critical geopolitical importance of which coon of the authors has considerable personal experience. The first author served extensively in India’s northeast and commanded Assam Rifles, a body of troops engaged in the region. India’s northeast is connected to the rest of India through what has come to be known as the “Chicken’s Neck.” This 20–22 kilometer stretch of land surrounded by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh is a key choke point for India, akin to the Strait of Malacca for China. Exacerbating Indian concerns about the Chicken’s Neck is the fact that the seven states in India’s northeast have been turbulent and China disputes Indian control of much territory of the northernmost state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The northeast’s “Seven Sisters” (a term for the seven states) have been home to fierce secessionist insurgencies that have cost India much blood and treasure. Reports that China plans to construct an airfield in Bangladesh’s Lalmonirhat district close to the Indian border naturally set alarm bells ringing in India. During his visit to Beijing, Yunus mused that Bangladesh could serve as “an extension of the Chinese economy.” He spoke of Bangladesh becoming the sole oceanic gateway for India’s landlocked Seven Sisters. Tellingly, supposedly democratic Bangladesh now explicitly opposes Taiwan’s independence. A Yunus-led Bangladeshi government has now clearly thrown in its lot with China, which is terrible news for India.
China’s growing digital footprint and rising PLA presence
In the new world of digital connectivity, China dominates Bangladesh’s 4G infrastructure and is now building 5G. Huawei rolled out the country’s first 5G network in Dhaka in December 2021. Surveillance systems, smart city components, data storage centers and facial recognition systems, all powered by Chinese technology, are becoming embedded in Bangladesh’s civic and policing infrastructure.
China’s digital penetration of Bangladesh has sparked concern among Indian cyber experts and policymakers. Data collected via Chinese-controlled systems, even if operated under Bangladeshi supervision, is potentially vulnerable to siphoning by the Chinese state. In an era where information is power, Bangladesh’s growing digital dependency on China is a great strategic worry for India.
A more obvious worry is Bangladesh’s extreme dependence on China for military equipment. After Pakistan, Bangladesh is the second-largest importer of Chinese kits. Since 2002, China has been Bangladesh’s largest supplier of military hardware, providing tanks, artillery, naval vessels, radar systems, fighter aircraft and training aircraft. China provided 73.6% of Bangladesh’s arms acquisitions between 2010 and 2020.
Bangladesh Navy acquired two Type 035G Ming-class submarines in 2016, marking a major shift in the maritime equation of the Bay of Bengal. In 2023, Dhaka inducted Chinese-origin VT-5 light tanks, and the Chinese are upgrading Bangladesh’s missile systems as well as air defense platforms.
Increasingly, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) trains Bangladeshi military officers. Till not too long ago, the Indian and Bangladeshi militaries had close links. Both were descended from the British Indian Army. Now, China has replaced India and Bangladesh’s National Defense College has a number of instructors from the PLA.
Rising India-Bangladesh trust deficit and why Delhi needs to act now
Over the years, a trust deficit has developed between Delhi and Dhaka. Even under Hasina, Bangladesh was deepening relations with China. It is an open secret that Hasina returned to power in 2008 with India’s support. Therefore, Delhi was able to convince Dhaka in 2016 “to abandon the Sonadia deep water port project China intended to build.” Yet by the end of 2003, 700 Chinese companies operated in Bangladesh. After the bloody 2020 India-China border clash, rising Chinese presence in Bangladesh fuelled disquiet in Indian national security circles.
Another issue muddying India-Bangladesh waters is immigration. Just as many Americans are concerned about migrants flooding in from across the Mexican border, some Indians worry about Bangladeshi immigrants flocking to their country. The Indian government’s attempts to institute a National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019 led to nationwide protests and misgivings in Bangladesh.
Bangladeshi scholar Sadia Korobi makes the point that complex demographics make the NRC and CAA emotive issues. Bangladeshis have settled in India in large numbers. They “frequently travel across to exchange commodities, work informal jobs, and visit family members.” In 2023, India-Bangladesh trade reached $15.9 billion. Bangladeshis worry that both the NRC and the CAA could cause an influx of Muslim immigrants to Bangladesh and damage trade.
Historians point out that the Muslim League began in 1906 in Dhaka. The religion that caused the partition of the states of Punjab in the west and Bengal to the east is still a fault line. Bangladesh won its independence from Pakistan in 1971 through Indian support. The Awami League championed the Bangla language and Bangladeshi nationalism. Yet there were Bangladeshi Islamists who distrusted India even in 1971.
Hasina severely repressed Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamist party in Bangladesh. It is an offshoot of an Islamist movement founded by Syed Abul A’la al-Maududi in 1941. This so-called direct descendant of Prophet Muhammad wanted to institute sharia (Islamic law), oppose Western imperialism, and oppose the three evils of secularism, nationalism and socialism. Jamaat-e-Islami opposed the independence of Bangladesh and the dismemberment of Pakistan. With Hasina’s fall, Jamaat-e-Islami’s influence has risen. The caretaker Yunus government regularly confers with Jamaat leaders who want closer ties with Pakistan and Turkey. Bangladesh’s political center of gravity has shifted away from India.
The fact that India has given refuge to Hasina sits poorly with Bangladesh’s new regime. As mentioned above, Nobel laureate Yunus has thrown in this country’s lot with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Ironically, democratic Bangladesh now supports authoritarian CCP claims over Taiwan. Though India-Bangladesh trade ties are still strong, Delhi and Dhaka no longer trust each other.
The authors believe that all is not lost yet. Many Bangladeshis still value a close relationship with India. They treasure trade ties and shared history. They have not forgotten that India backed Bangladeshi independence at a time when Pakistani troops were engaged in violent repression, genocide and mass rape. Delhi must engage with Bangladeshi civil society as well as the youth. Note that over 40% of the Bangladeshi population is under 25. A renewed emphasis on connectivity, cultural ties, educational exchanges and digital collaboration could potentially offset Beijing’s checkbook diplomacy.
As of now though, the Indian government has to recognize the urgency of countering China’s moves. Delhi fears antagonizing Dhaka. Indian diplomats speak of strategic patience. In reality, muddled thinking, lack of focus and inaction imperil long-term Indian interests. Indian policymakers need to engage the new Bangladeshi regime with a judicious mix of accommodation and assertion. If Delhi does not act now, it may lose its leverage in Dhaka permanently.
[Shokin Chauhan first published a version of this piece on Substack.]
[Members of Fair Observer’s Young Editors Program collectively edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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